Dueling and Honor: Its Meaning, Fate, and Implications on Interstate Violence
Introduction
Honor, an antiquated concept to the modern human in the 21st century, was part of the fundamental definitions of people’s social worth and status in the middle ages. It is their “excellence recognized by society” and their “right to pride” (Pitt-Rivers 1977, 1). In smaller agglomerations that lacked formal state control, self-helped forms of violence usually took the state’s place in defending one’s honor. The lack of protection on their assets, the scarcity of resources in sedentary populations, and the close face-to-face interactions in small communities had perpetuated honor as “the ideology of property holding group which struggles to defined, enlarge, and protect its patrimony in a competitive arena” (Schneider 1971, 2). To defend one’s integrity, self-help violence is inexplicably exercised to guarantee the safety and social value of properties and lives as the “ultimate vindication of honor” (Blok 2001, 206).
In Europe, dueling was a ritualized practice with deep cultural links to male honor, enacted by the aristocrats and the plebeians. Men’s identity was based on their social credibility and masculinity established through dueling and other violence alike. However, duels gradually became a feudal element of the bygone eras with changes in the societies. In this essay, I will examine the cultural meanings associated with dueling and similar male violence, outlining its ritualization and display of honor across societies in Europe. Then, I will deconstruct the demise of these violent behaviors in the political, ideological, and economic aspects. In the end, I will discuss how the decline of dueling and self-help violence enlightens us on the future of wars and project the possible abolition of interstate conflicts.
Dueling, Ritualized Violence, and Male Honor
The main practice of duels has some prominent features, including its ritualized fashion and the connotation of honor between close circles of people with minor differences. The ritualization entails particular rules and etiquettes. Usually, these rules manifest in prescribing specific time and place, selecting outfits and weapons, and certain vocabulary uses. These formalized constituents of dueling imply its non-randomized nature. To go through such detailed protocols of physical violence, one must have sought to eventual certain vital purposes, making dueling a “mechanical move towards a certain goal” (Blok 2001, 109). Moreover, for these protocols to be commonly recognized, these goals must also be shared among the community as self-implicating ends of duels. Rather than being a kind of senseless violence, the very ritualized nature of dueling indicates its cultural meaning as social interaction. It tries to communicate how far a man is willing to go to vindicate his honor. This honor is not only bounded by the complete control of his material possessions but also associated with his cultural capital in the form of reputation. It is a “refined violence between equals” that aims to defend one’s honor as a social obligation that risks the most terrible sacrifices of one’s life (Blok 2001, 125).
Italian dueling in the 16th century followed these exact scripts among the elites. It usually originated from correcting someone’s false claims of oneself as a liar. Other than picking a venue, a weapon, and a time, each party of the duel also needed to find a respected member in the community to go through mediation and ensure both parties are fully dedicated to risk it all (Luksic and Howell 2019). This process was to be as equal as possible. In this case, it was exactly these minor differences between people from similar social classes or cultural links that pose threats to their identities (Blok 2001, 121). This male identity was vulnerable to any backlash against one’s honor, primarily based on this moral responsibility in exacting penalties on behalf of his family and women. His honor heavily depends on his superiority in the economic activity that subordinated women and his control over their sexual activities (Blok 2001, 149).
In early 19th century Greece, the common occurrence of knife fighting among the plebeians exhibited similar characteristics to dueling among European aristocrats. This form of violence is usually recorded legally as simple assaults, distinctive from vendetta killing in its main purpose is to harm than to slay, and distinct from dueling as it happens immediately after insults and contains an after-act in court. Primarily, the Ionian Island men of the Mediterranean grounded their masculinity on the ready recourse provided by knife fighting when their reputation was challenged (Gallant 2000, 362). When insults of certain words were uttered in public spaces such as taverns, knives would be drawn in an attempt to scar the opponents’ faces. The particularity of the rituals during knife fighting now began. The audiences mainly observed and evaluated, and only when blood is finally shed from scarring would they separate the two parties. The winner then celebrated his victory by spitting on the opponent, taking blood from the harmed with his handkerchief, or wiping the blood on his knife (Gallant 2000, 363). The ritual continued after the violence. Instead of fleeing the scene, the winner would wait for local authorities to be taken to court, in which place his victory would be made official to the greater public with convictions of minor penalties. This performance in court further exemplified the importance of knife fighting in garnering respect. In the incidents investigated by Gallant, men attributed the fights to be about “reputation, honor, insults and vulgar verbal assaults” (2000, 370). Overall, the male honor being strived for during knife fighting stemmed from the social construction of masculinity in its ability to withstand provocations and fight in the name of its own and household reputation, particularly of the females in the family. In the end, losing a fight does not dishonor a man as long as he played the game. However, his reputation may still suffer variably in the face of loss.
These examples above demonstrated a strong connection between honor and male dueling. For the noble class in Italy, dueling was an obligation of a gentleman. And for the peasants in Greece, knife duels were the social conduct of a true man. The acts of exaggerated ritualization especially marked the social meaning contained in them: how to be a proper man with respect. Only through actively and bravely accepting challenges in circumstances that put their honor in danger, and engaging in physical violence to solidify their strength and dignity can they fit into the hegemonic social category of a masculine man.
The Decline in Dueling and Male-Dominated Public Violence
Throughout the civilizing process, dueling and frequent occurrences of public violence gradually disappeared in our daily lives. The belligerence of the civilized human in modernity is visibly subdued compared to the people in the middle ages (Elias 230). Despite the documented love for battle and joy in killing in the clerical writings of early modern Europe, where more pronounced aggressiveness in the personality fitted very well with the social structure that allowed and perpetuated uses of brute forces for self-help, our affect structure seemed to have been altered to be repulsed by deliberately initiated violence or aggression. Humans in the past were recorded to be passionate about violence, especially men who constantly bear the duty to defend their honor in physical aggression. In fact, the decline of dueling and male-dominated public violence can be accredited to social changes in the external environment, and I argue these changes to be either political, ideological, or economically related.
The pope first opposed dueling in Italy in the 1200s due to the ethos of dueling, boasting the idea that God is on the winner’s side (Luksic and Howell 2019). Gradually, the state became less and less tolerant of it as well. Dueling had its own rules that settled justice with a different set of laws determined by the elite. It was a unique form of privilege belonging to the nobles that undercut the state’s monopoly on civil laws and was no longer omissible by the centralized authority. Other than the state, the Christian churches infiltrated into people's daily lives with a moral ideal in juxtaposition to the honor culture. Christianity propelled humbleness and generosity, but the honor code in dueling promoted overt emotions and strict settlements of battle. Honor became in opposition to both the legal and ethical principles, shaping people to conduct humility and civil behaviors that were subjected to the state’s dictates, leaving dueling to the past.
In Greece, knife duels’ gradual fading was also woven into the civilizing process with changes from above. Firstly, it could be explained by its differences from elitist duels. The court appearance was part of the dueling ritual that materialized honor for the plebeian men. Ionian aristocracy also entrusted the court to be a judge of honor. They did not duel and were conscious of instigating confrontations to avoid destructive vendetta killings. Their involvement in litigation and lawsuits shifted power to the court system, encouraging the plebeian men to follow suit and rely more on the court to settle criminal slander. Furthermore, laws were implemented to prohibit men from carrying bladed weapons in public, partially resulting in intensified sentences against knife fighting (Gallant 2000, 377-379). Secondly, similar to dueling in Italy, ideological changes were also part of civilizing men’s propensity to incite violence. In the 1830s, the pro-British colonial power brought with them social evolution theories that deemed the violence-seeking Mediterranean men to be non-western savages. The Orthodox Church also condemned violent criminal offenders to “eternal damnation” (Gallant 2000, 378). These cultural discourses gradually affected the Ionian men to avert violent behaviors. Lastly, the nationalist movement in the 1850s changed its strategy against the British from encouraging violent confrontations to pacifist resistance in the form of political disruption (Gallant 2000, 378). It was nationalist propaganda that associated violence with anti-Greek sentiments, constituting a robust discourse that reinforced the disinclinations to violent behaviors such as knife-fighting. Unlike in Italy, where religious ideologies challenged the honor code, the ethos of honor was kept intact in the Greek men. Violence was attacked by the legislators, statesmen, priests, and nationalists, effecting the gradual decline of knife duels. Nevertheless, these social changes could be classified similarly to the Italian scenario, belonging to the political or ideological category.
In 18th century London, recorded homicide was mostly responsible by men, constituting a huge part of publicly conducted violence. However, according to Shoemaker, while the population more than doubled between 1690 and 1791, indictments for homicides decreased by around 80%, dropping from 3.9% per 100,000 population to 0.6% (2001, 192-193). Dueling was also frequently enacted in the death studied, making up 15% of the homicide sample (2001, 192-195). Noblemen’s duel also adhered to strict rules that emphasized the fairness of the fight, which was more democratized with increasingly generous definitions of gentlemen (2001, 197-198). Regarding the reasons behind these public violence occurrences, resembling prior discussions, Shoemaker pointed to the prevailing theme of threatened male honor rooted in gender superiority and aggression-permeated masculinity. Physical violence demonstrated their “courage, strength, and independence” when confronted with insults against their integrity, morality, bravery, and social status. Without exceptions, protecting women was also part of the motivations for male violence, by which men affirmed their dominant social positions in the household (2001, 194-196). However, with the increase of duels in volume, their damages were much less fatal, representing a change in the honor code. The overall drop in homicide rate also proved changes in attitudes toward exercising violence. For the gentlemen, male honor was gradually criticized as an outdated concept as violent behaviors contrasted with the urban code of civility and politeness (2001, 200-201). Swords were also less carried to be used as weapons in conflicts. For ordinary men, public violence with swords also saw a decline after 1750 (2001, 205). In this example, the decrease in public violence was heavily dependent upon urbanization and commercialization which altered the social structure. Commercial credit replaced social reputation as the new proof of credibility. Social mobility led by industrialization and capitalization also weakened community-dependent public opinion (2001, 207). The honor was no longer the outward expression of physical violence but was internalized as inner virtue. In addition, ideological incorporations of evangelical revivals assimilated the modern ideals that emphasized sensitivity and gentility in men. Overall, honor found alternative channels to be shown in the industrialized economy. The fundamental values contained in honor also changed along with the urban code of conduct that adjusted masculinity to be less violent. Noted, the decrease in violent male behavior in the public was not reflected in the domestic sphere. Women still had to tolerate violence from men in the household. The urbanized men may have found civilized resolutions to their conflicts with other men. Still, the modern emphasis on domesticity and economic stability may have further installed insecurity in men as providers and patriarchal leads, which sustained the problematic behaviors of domestic violence against women.
Parent also comparatively investigated the end of dueling with industrialization among several nation-states. The outcome was a high correlation between how early the state began industrialization and the abolition of duel culture. Early-industrialized states tended to have fewer dueling remnants than the late industrializers (2009, 290-292). Early industrialization diffused elite interests more rapidly which gave ample time for the noblemen to be turned into the bourgeoisie, who were fully showered in the commercial logic and gave up atavistic dueling norms for capital accumulation. Primarily, it was due to the class distinguisher shifting from martial heritage to capital ownership. Late industrializers prompted advancements in the middle class that threatened the class interests of the elites. Left with little time to respond, they latched on to dueling as the traditional honor code that separated them from the new middle classes.
Through these examples and analysis, modern men’s affect structure was evidently modified by the social conditions to be less likely to engage in public violence. These changes came from political, ideological, and economic forces, meaning overgrowing state power that formalized the legal code to be less permissive on unruly violent behaviors, ideological headwinds from religion or the authority that propagate new meanings to honor and masculinity, and industrialization that shattered the need for community-based respect under the economic system that dictated new class-distinguishers and civilized social interactions.
Self-Help Violence and the Abolition of War
Dueling died as a feudal element of the historical past, and its death might serve as lessons for the inhabitants of the modern age on the future of interstate violence. If dueling went out of fashion, maybe wars could be eradicated as well. However, Parent argued that dueling misses key features of wars in its lack of anarchy and exclusive nature bounded by one’s class position. Interstate warfare takes place on the global stage without a centralized authority that overrules all nation-states, while dueling was practiced in hierarchy-based social systems. In this case, feuding, the ancestor of dueling that is inclusive and legal, might provide critical insights given the similarities of its anarchic model with international relations (Parent 2009, 282).
When effective central control is missing on the means of violence, people turn to their kin for trusted assistance and loyalty (Blok 2001, 101), initiating forms of self-help violence for protection. Feuding was a perfect recourse for people living in anarchic societies where monopolized control was absent. It is a form of kin-based vengeance with self-enforced claims, legally intact and needing no appeals from higher authorities (Parent 2009, 288). Existing much earlier than duelling, feuding was the legitimate solution before and at the early stage of state formations. The functional similarity between feuding and war lies precisely in their “weakly institutionalized environment” (Parent 2009, 293). States are stand-alone entities with weak bounds from international regulations. In addition, feuding and global conflict are methods taken to defend one’s honor and reputation. Moreover, states form affinitive bonds through international diplomacy, achieving relations that mirror kinship systems. Interstate wars often function with several interest groups similar to families in feuds. Lastly, mediation is usually leveraged when international conflict boils to exhaustion, leading to the end of conflicts with banishment or sanctions in the form of money—this process analogs feuding very well.
As states began the violent project that causes destructions, initiated extractions and exploitations of resources, expanded the control of the powers, and centralized ruling by force (Tilly 1985: 169), violent self-help in the form of feuding gave way to illegal violence such as dueling in the newly emerged hierarchies. Later on, dueling also fell in popularity with the state’s later intensified legal and moral control, accompanied by ideological movements and industrialization. Parent reported the decline in both feuding and dueling to be with minimal normative leadership and campaigns but with growing material capabilities of the states (2009, 294). The state-building project eventually overrode feuding with competency to contain and deter public violence. Therefore, for international warfare, one might envision that a similar condition needs to be met for it to diminish completely. One central power that transcends and encompasses all affinity-based collections of nation-states may be necessary to appease interstate conflicts with its immense material capabilities that hold all states within its authority.
Conclusion
Dueling and other self-help violence were products of specific social conditions when external authority was fragile. They were violent expressions utilized by men to display honor and defend the dignity of the reputation of their families and their own. Over the civilizing process, leviathan-like state power materialized and established its force, effecting changes in the legal and ethical codes, prompting new versions of masculinity and male honor that overall held violence in disdain. Under this grand picture of centralizing authority, the gradual decline of dueling and violent activities alike also went through ideological fluctuations such as religious and nationalistic discourses that encouraged subdued aggression, and industrialization that commercialized the social structure with individualized forms of respect tied closely to capital instead of physical violence.
The end to dueling and feuding could be instructive in abolishing wars, especially given the analogous qualities shared between feuding and wars in its external anarchic condition, honor-driven purposes, kin-based bonds among entities, and overall process of conflict and settlements. Their demises infer a possibility for interstate wars to be eradicated if an ultra-state authority can be established to oversee all nation-states. By state-building on the international scale, interstate violence might cease with the authority shifting to this ultra-state enterprise.
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